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Abstract
This study examines the determinants of multiple states of financial distress by applying a
competing-risks model. It investigates the effect of financial ratios, market-based
variables and company-specific variables, including company age, size and squared size
on three different states of corporate financial distress: active companies; distressed
external administration companies; and distressed takeover, merger or acquisition
companies. A sample of 1,081 publicly listed Australian non-financial companies over
the period 1989 to 2005 using a competing-risks model is used to determine the possible
differences in the factors of entering various states of financial distress. It is found that
specifically, distressed external administration companies have a higher leverage, lower
past excess returns and a larger size; while distressed takeover, merger or acquisition
companies have a lower leverage, a higher capital utilisation efficiency and a larger size
compared to active companies. Comparing the results from both the single-risk model and
the competing-risks model reveals the need to distinguish between financial distress
states.
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1.

Introduction

Over the last decade there exists evidence of an increasing number of corporate collapses
including Enron, WorldCom, Tyco and HealthSouth. In Australia, notable failures include
HIH Insurance, OneTel, Ansett Airlines and Fincorp. Such collapses of financially distressed
companies often entails significant direct and indirect costs to many stakeholders. There is a
view that these costs can be avoided if financially distressed companies are identified well
before their ultimate failure. Lau (1987) argues that such companies face a continuum of
financial distress states before they go bankrupt. Hensher, Jones and Greene (2007) argue that
a model that incorporates multiple states of financial distress provides a wider range of
distress scenarios that public companies typically face in the real world. The literature on the
predictions of traditional corporate financial distress in general focusses on the conventional
failing and non-failing dichotomy. For example, Altman (1968b), Ohlson (1980) and
Shumway (2001) examine the companies that actually went bankrupt. Jones and Hensher
(2007) argue that the inclusion of multiple states of financially distressed companies in the
model provides an opportunity to examine the effect of explanatory variables across the
diverse states of financial distress.
A company may exit the market for several different reasons: such as through merger,
acquisition, voluntary liquidation and bankruptcy; and each type of exit is likely to be
affected by different factors (Schary 1991; Harhoff, Stahl & Woywode 1998; Prantl 2003;
Rommer 2004). Johnsen and Melicher (1994) examined the added value of the information
provided in predicting corporate bankruptcy by defining three states of financial distress,
namely: non-bankrupt, financially weak and bankrupt firms. Dickerson, Gibson and
Tsakalotos (1999) investigated the determinants of UK manufacturing companies making
acquisitions and being acquired. Wheelock and Wilson (2000) assumed that the causal
processes for acquisitions and failures were different, and utilised the competing-risks hazard
model to identify the characteristics that made individual US banks more likely to fail or be
acquired. Harhoff, Stahl & Woywode 1998, Prantl (2003) and Rommer (2004) also
confirmed the importance of distinguishing between different types of corporate exits.
In the Australian context, Jones and Hensher (2004) introduced the three-state
financial distress model to examine the listed companies in the ASX (Australian Stock
Exchange). This study was extended by Hensher, Jones and Greene (2007) and Jones and
Hensher (2007), who added the distressed merger as an additional important state of financial
distress. These studies used the advanced logit model (i.e. the mixed logit, multinomial error
component logit and nested logit model). However, none of these studies considered ‘time to
failure’ as an integral factor in corporate distress analysis. We use a competing risks Cox
proportional hazard model, which enables the incorporation of time to event as the dependent
variable in corporate distress analysis. Also, the variables used in the model are timedependent variables (i.e. they can change in value over the study period).
Our analysis is based on three main categories of variables: financial ratios, marketbased data and company-specific variables. We use a sample of publicly listed Australian
companies (except those in the financial sector), during the period 1989 to 2005. In so doing,
three different states of financial distress are employed: active companies, distressed external
administration companies and distressed takeover, merger or acquisition companies. The
determinants of each state are examined and interpreted through the competing-risks model.
In order to examine the determinant of the three states of these financial distresses, we
investigate the effects of financial data, market-based variables and company-specific
variables on the three unordered states of financially distressed Australian companies. We
also compare the pooled model with the competing-risks model. However, it should be
mentioned that most existing studies do not distinguish between states of financial distress,
28

Chancharat, Tian, Davy, McCrae and Lodh: Financially Distressed Companies and a Competing-risks Model

while some only suggest discriminating between the different types of exit or financial
distress (Lau 1987; Rommer 2004; Rommer 2005).
The reason for selecting Australia is that it follows the English common law tradition
that is prevalent in the US and the UK. Furthermore, Australia follows free market policies
like the US. We seek to provide external validation of the results documented based on
studies on the US market. We argue that this study is the first attempt to apply the competingrisks Cox proportional hazards approach for modelling multiple states of corporate financial
distress in an Australian context. We expect that the factors driving companies to enter
various states of financial distress are different. More specifically, that distressed external
administration companies will have a higher leverage, lower past excess returns and a larger
size; while distressed takeover, merger or acquisition companies will have a lower leverage, a
higher capital utilisation efficiency and a larger size compared to active companies.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews previous
studies on predicting multiple states of financial distress. Section 3 describes the
methodology employed in the study. Section 4 describes the data and sample. Section 5
presents and discusses the empirical results. The final section presents the conclusion and
draws possible future extensions of this research.
2.

Literature Review

This section reviews the existing background literature. The first sub-section elaborates the
literature on the multiple states of the financial distress prediction model. The second subsection reviews the background literature on the application of the competing-risks model in
the multiple states of financial distress prediction.
Multiple States of Financial Distress
Most of the existing corporate financial distress prediction literature focusses on the two-state
failure model. For example, Altman (1968b), Ohlson (1980) and Shumway (2001) examine
the financial distress factors of companies that went bankrupt. Schary (1991) argues that a
firm may exit the business in several ways including through merger, acquisition, voluntary
liquidation or bankruptcy. Each form of these exits is likely to be caused by different factors.
Hensher, Jones and Greene (2007) argue that outright failure does not capture the full
spectrum of financial distress in practice. They argue that there are reasons for this, such as:
financially distressed firms seeking merger or amalgamations; firms eliminating dividend
payments; and firms defaulting on loans or raising capital to alleviate financial distress. The
focus on the dichotomy of conventional failing and non-failing only provides a limited
representation of the financial distress spectrum typically faced by companies in practice
(Lau 1987; Hensher Jones & Greene 2007). Models that explain failure without considering
acquisition (Harhoff, Stahl & Woywode 1998), or models that allow for acquisition without
considering failure, are both likely to suffer from a sample selection problem and thus the
estimation results can be biased (Koke 2002).
Several other studies also examine the relationships between multiple states of
corporate financial distress. For example, Lau (1987) utilises multivariate logit analysis to
estimate the probability that a firm will enter each of the five ranked financial states. 1 The
results of this study show that multivariate logit analysis outperforms multivariate
The considered five multiple states are as follows: State 0 (zero) – financial stability; State 1 – omitting or
reducing dividend payments; State 2 – technical defaults and default on loan payments; State 3 – protection
under Chapter X or XI of the American bankruptcy act (US House of Representatives, 2005); and State 4 –
bankruptcy and liquidation.

1
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discriminant analysis, and that for some explanatory variables, the empirical results agree
with the expectation of the models of prediction time horizons.
Johnsen and Melicher (1994) also used multinomial logit models to examine the value
of information in predicting corporate bankruptcy. Their study identifies three states of
financial distress: non-bankrupt, financially weak and bankrupt firms. The results confirm
that adding the ‘financially weak’ state can reduce the misclassification error, and the three
states of financial health appear to be independent.
Although Lau (1987) improved the two-state failure prediction model by using a fivestate model, it was not without limitations. For example, the multinomial logit used was not
robust enough for violations of the independent and identically distributed (IID) data and
independence for irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumptions. These assumptions are considered
in several studies including Jones and Hensher (2004), Hensher and Jones (2007), Hensher,
Jones and Greene (2007) and Jones and Hensher (2007).
In the context of financial distress prediction, Jones and Hensher (2004) demonstrated
the empirical usefulness of a mixed ordered logit model. Their study introduced a three-state
financial distress model: State 0 (zero) – non-failed firms; State 1 (one) – insolvent firms; and
State 2 (two) – firms that filed for bankruptcy and appointed either liquidators or insolvency
administrators or receivers. Their results also confirmed the superiority of the mixed logit
over multinomial logit models.
In a recent study, Hensher and Jones (2007) further extended several ways to optimise
the explanatory and predictive performance of the mixed logit model in forecasting corporate
bankruptcy. They investigated five applications of the ordered mixed logit model using a
three-state failure model. The results revealed that the unconditional triangular distribution
for random parameters offers the best population-level predictive performance in a hold-out
sample.
Hensher, Jones and Greene (2007) also extended the Jones and Hensher (2004) study
and found that the error component logit model offered an improved explanatory power over
a standard logit specification. Jones and Hensher (2007) also extended their previous study,
and found that the nested logit model outperformed a standard logit model. These advanced
logit models further improved the power of the probability predicting of financial distress.
Competing-risks Model Application
While the standard logit and advanced logit models reviewed in the previous section are
powerful for predicting the probability of financial distress, they do not deal with the ‘time to
event’. 2 It is the survival analysis techniques which allow the modelling of time to event by
incorporating it as the dependent variable. Harhoff, Stahl & Woywode (1998) employed the
competing-risks model to develop an important conceptual and empirical distinction between
two modes of exit (voluntary liquidation and bankruptcy). Their study was based on German
firms. The results reveal that pooling exit types is a major source of misspecification. Prantl
(2003) also examined bankruptcy and voluntary liquidation of the newly founded firms in
Germany by using the competing-risks model.
Utilising a competing-risks proportional hazards model, Perez, Llopis and Llopis
(2002) also found differences in the factors determining exit. They argue that the determinant
is mainly dependent on the exit route in terms of firm and industry characteristics. Their
study was based on Spanish firms. Their results further confirmed the findings of Harhoff,
2

Koke (2002) suggest that acquisition and failure tend to be influenced by common factors. This implies that
they should be examined in combination.
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Stahl & Woywode (1998) in that pooling exit routes into the same analysis is a major source
of misspecification.
Dickerson, Gibson and Tsakalotos (1999) also employed the competing-risks model,
specifically the Weibull hazard model and the semi-parametric hazard model, to investigate
the determinants of UK manufacturing companies making acquisitions. The study confirmed
that companies making acquisitions can reduce their conditional probability of being taken
over.
Rommer (2004) examined three types of exit by Danish non-financial public and
private limited liability companies using the competing-risks model. The three types of firms
they investigated included financially distressed firms, voluntarily liquidated firms and
merger or acquisition firms. It was found that the proportion of correct predictions was higher
in the competing-risks model than in the pooled logit model.
Wheelock and Wilson (2000) further utilised a competing-risks model to identify the
characteristics that made individual US banks more likely to fail or to be acquired. It was
assumed that the causal processes for acquisitions and failures were different, and that the
occurrence of either event precluded the other, so the competing-risks hazard model was used
to identify characteristics leading to each outcome.
To investigate the determinants of time to bankruptcy and time to merger jointly, and
also to investigate their interdependence, Yu (2006) used the dependent competing-risks
model assuming that time to bankruptcy and time to merger were interdependent in credit
cooperatives in Japan. It is argued that the independent competing-risks model, which
assumed the independence of the two hazards, might not fully describe the failure and merger
processes, and may thus generate inconsistent estimates. The bankruptcy and merger
processes can be interrelated, and some unobservable, firm-specific characteristics may exist
that can affect both bankruptcy and merger processes. Yu (2006) suggests that the common
practice of assuming the independence of the competing risks would produce biased
estimates and a lower predictive accuracy.
3.

Methodology

In order to examine the determinants of multiple states of corporate financial distress we
employed the survival analysis model within the competing-risks framework.
Survival Analysis Technique
Survival analysis is a class of statistical method to examine the occurrence and timing of
events. In survival analysis, an ‘event’ is defined as a qualitative change that can be situated
in time (Allison 1995, p2). Since companies may change state – from ‘healthy’ to ‘financial
distress’ – the event of interest in our study is defined as a company entering into a
financially distressed state.
Compared to the traditional methods (for example, the Multiple Discriminant
Analysis (MDA), logit and probit models), two key benefits of survival analysis emerge.
These include the ability to handle time-varying variables and censored observations.
Time-varying variables are the explanatory variables that change with time. We used
financial ratios, market-based data and company-specific variables (which are similar to timevarying variables), because their values can change over time. We argue that the symptoms of
financial distress are observable from the deterioration of financial ratios, or that the effect of
such ratios on corporate failures do not stay constant over time (Luoma & Laitinen 1991).
Censored observations are those that have never experienced the event during the
observation time. Censoring occurs when the duration of the study is limited in time. In our
31

AAFBJ | Volume 4, no. 4, 2010

study, censored observations are only made on active companies that have not entered into a
financially distressed state.
Survival analysis contains two key functions: the survival function and the hazard
function. The survival function, S(t), gives the probability that the time until the firm
experiences the event, T, is greater than a given time, t. Thus T is a random variable that
defines the time event for particular observations. The survival function is stated as follows:
S (t ) = Pr(T > t )

(1)

The hazard function defines the instantaneous risk of an event occurring at time t,
assuming that the firm survives to time t. The hazard function is also known as the ‘hazard
rate’ because it is a dimensional quantity that has the number of events per interval of time.
The hazard function is defined as follows:
h (t ) = lim

Pr( t ≤ T < t + Δt X , T ≥ t )
Δt

Δt → 0

(2)

The relationship between the survival function and the hazard function is that the
hazard function equals the change in the log-survivor function, as follows:

h(t ) = −

d ln(s (t ))
.
dt

(3)

The Cox proportional hazards model is a semi-parametric model used for survival
analysis. The Cox (1972) study contains two significant innovations – the proportional
hazards model and maximum partial likelihood. The proportional hazards model is stated as
follows:
hi (t ) = h0 (t ) exp(X i β )

(4)

where h0(t) is an arbitrary, unspecified baseline hazard rate that measures the effect of time
on the hazard rate for an individual whose variables have values of zeros. X represents the
vector of variables that influences the hazard, and β is the vector of their coefficients.
Equivalently, the regression model is written as follows:
log hi(t) = α(t)+ β1Xi1 + β2Xi2 +… + βkX ik

(5)

where hi(t) is hazard function for individual i and α(t) = logh0(t) and h0(t) is an arbitrary,
unspecified baseline hazard rate (LeClere 2000).
This model does not require the particular probability distribution specification of the
survival times. It possesses the property that different individuals have hazard functions that
are proportional and are thus stated as follows:
hi ( t )
= exp[ β ( X − X ) + β ( X − X ) + ... + β ( X − X )]
1 i1
j1
2 i2
j2
k ik
jk
h j (t )

(6)

The ratio of the hazard functions for two individuals does not vary with time t. This special
property makes the Cox proportional hazard model more robust.
To estimate the coefficients of β, Cox (1972) proposes a partial likelihood function
based on a conditional probability of failure by assuming that no tied values exist in the
survival times. The function was later modified to handle ties (Efron 1977). We used SAS
PROC PHREG (a SAS programming code for constructing a Cox model) to complete the
estimation.
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Competing-risks Model

The risk of entering into any state of financial distress is modelled using a framework in
which each identified company is concurrently under risk for all states of financial distress
over the selected period. The undertaken three different states of financial distress are
considered to be mutually exclusive events (i.e. the occurrence of one type of event removes
the firm from being at risk for all other types of event), and therefore the competing-risks
model is deemed to be more appropriate.
We have estimated the survival likelihood for two subsets of firms (which were
delisted due to financial distress or takeovers and acquisitions) using a competing-risks Cox’s
model; where, in addition to survival time, the different causes of an event are observed
(Andersen, Abildstrom & Rosthoj 2002).
There are several ways that the problem of competing risks can be approached, but
the most common approach is to begin by defining a type-specific or cause-specific hazard
function (Ghilagaber 1998). We have denoted R as representing the different states of
financial distress which are indexed by the cause-specific hazard for each company (r). r is an
identification code for each company. Therefore, R ≥ 2 – since our analysis focusses on the
multiple states of financial distress, including active companies, distressed external
administration companies and distressed takeover, merger or acquisition companies. The
random variable C represents the cause of failure and therefore in the presence of R a causespecific hazard function can be defined as follows:
hr (t ) = lim

Pr(t ≤ T < t + Δt , C = r T ≥ t )

Δt →0

Δt

, r = 1,..., R

(7)

Where hr(t) is the instantaneous rate of occurrence of type r at time t and in the
presence of R-1 events.
The overall hazard of financial distress is the sum of all of the type-specific hazards,
which is expressed as:
R

h(t ) = ∑ hr ( t )

(8)

r =1

Narendranathan and Stewart (1991) show that the log-likelihood for the competingrisks model is additive and can be separated into terms where each term is a function of the
parameters of a single, cause-specific hazard. Thus, in order to estimate competing-risks Cox
proportional hazards models, the estimation must first be preceded with the estimation of
single-risk hazard, treating durations of exit for other reasons than filed for external
administration process or subject to a takeover, merger or acquisition arrangement as
censored at the point of completion.
Therefore, a further estimation model is needed and stated as follows:
hri (t ) = hr 0 (t ) exp( X ri ( t ) β r )

(9)

Where r = f (distressed external administration, distressed takeover, merger or
acquisition).
Two separate Cox proportional hazards models are also estimated for the competing
risks, and the other states of financial distresses are considered as censored observations.
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4.

Data and sample

To apply the competing-risks Cox proportional hazards form of survival analysis to the
population of all companies listed on the ASX, we used annual data of financial ratios, stock
prices and company-specific variables of Age and Size for the period 1989 to 2005. We
excluded the companies in the financial sectors from the analysis because of their different
financial statements structure. 3
For our analysis, financial distress is defined in three unordered mutually exclusive
states, as follows:
State 0: Active companies.
State 1: Distressed external administration companies. These companies are defined as
financially distressed companies which have filed for an external administration
process. As per the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), four categories of external
administration process exist: (1) voluntary administration; (2) scheme of arrangement;
(3) receivership; and (4) liquidation (Attorney-General’s Department 2005). The date
of entering into external administration was purchased from the Australian Securities
and Investments Commission (ASIC) 4 .
State 2: Distressed takeover, merger or acquisition companies. This state is defined as
financially distressed companies which were delisted from the ASX because they
were subject to a takeover, merger or acquisition arrangement. The data for delisted
reasons, company announcement and delisted date are collected from the FinAnalysis
database.
As pointed out by Clark and Ofek (1994), if a firm experiences operating or financial
difficulties then there exist several potential actions. One such remedy is to restructure
financially distressed firms through a merger. Therefore, including distressed takeover,
merger or acquisition provides an opportunity to further examine more diverse states of
financial distress.
A sample of active and distressed companies in State 0, State 1 and State 2 was
collected for the period from 1989 to 2005. The final sample consisted of 891 active listed
companies, 50 distressed external administration companies and 140 distressed takeover,
merger or acquisition companies.
Time to event or survival time is defined as follows: for distressed companies, the
survival time is the total number of years from the first year when data is available to the year
of financial distress. This definition is applied to both distressed external administration
companies and distressed takeover, merger or acquisition companies. For active companies,
the survival time is the total number of years from the first year when data is available to the
last year observed. During the study period, each of the companies were analysed to follow
up whether they experienced an event in one of the multiple states of financial distress (e.g.
filed for an external administration process or were subjected to a takeover, merger or
acquisition arrangement).
3

Ideally, we would have liked to use the information from the entire history of a company since its
establishment, but such financial statement information was not available prior to the fiscal year 1989.
Therefore, the models presented in this study are based on duration data truncated to the left, because they
pertain only to the period since 1989.

4

The authors are grateful to the School of Accounting and Finance and the School of Mathematics and Applied
Statistics, University of Wollongong, for financial support in obtaining the data.
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The explanatory variables used in the model are financial ratios, market-based data
and company-specific variables. Financial ratios have long been widely used in explaining
the possibility of corporate financial distress (see Beaver (1966); Altman (1968a); Bongini,
Ferri & Hahm (2000); Routledge & Gadenne (2000); Catanach & Perry (2001); and Rommer
(2005)). In a seminal study, Beaver (1966) used financial ratios with a univariate technique.
According to Beaver (1966), six financial ratios were the best predictors in financial failure
prediction: (1) cash flow to total debt; (2) net income to total assets; (3) total liabilities to
total assets; (4) working capital to total assets; (5) current ratio; and (6) no credit interval.
Altman (1968a) develops the well-known Z score model utilising multivariate discriminant
analysis as the technique including the financial ratios as explanatory variables. It was found
that five financial ratios are the best predictors in the corporate bankruptcy prediction model:
(1) working capital to total assets; (2) retained earnings to total assets; (3) earnings before
interest and taxes to total assets; (4) market value equity to par value of debt; and (5) sales to
total assets.
We have incorporated financial ratios measured in four main categories of firms
including profitability, liquidity, leverage and activity ratios in the model. The selection
criteria is based on the following: (1) data availability in the FinAnalysis database consisting
of financial statements of Australian firms; (2) the selected predictive variables from previous
studies; and (3) the significance of the selected variables. Finally, there are nine financial
ratios considered in the model as follows: earnings before interest and taxes margin (EBIT
margin), return on equity and return on assets are used to measure profitability; current ratio,
quick ratio and working capital to total assets ratio are used in order to measure firm
liquidity; debt ratio is used to measure a firm’s leverage; and capital turnover and total asset
turnover are used to measure the efficiency of a firm’s assets utilisation.
Market-based data is also used to investigate the relationship of market returns and
the likelihood of financial distress. Shumway (2001) used two market-driven variables
including a firm’s past excess returns (or market-adjusted returns) and idiosyncratic standard
deviation of firm’s stock returns in forecasting bankruptcy. The hazard model results of this
study indicate that the use of the market variable is only representative at the 5% significance
level. However, when both market and accounting variables are used, the idiosyncratic
standard deviation of a firm’s stock is not a significant variable in forecasting bankruptcy.
These results are also consistent with Mossman et al. (1998). According to Mossman et al.
(1998), for a 12 month period, the market-adjusted return variable is significant in bankruptcy
prediction model while the standard variation variable of market-adjusted return is not
significant in forecasting bankruptcy.
As financial ratios can be window-dressed using creative accounting to show
improved financial figures, we include the company’s past excess returns as market-based
data in the model. The standard deviation of a firm’s stock returns is omitted due to a lack of
available data for the company’s monthly stock returns.
Company specific variables (such as age, size and squared size) are also included in
the analysis. We use the natural logarithm of sales as the proxy for company size, and the
number of years since registration as the proxy for company age to test the association
between company age and size for corporate endurance.
To allow for the non-linear relationship between company size and the likelihood of
financial distress, we also include the square of size. This is consistent with the previous
literature relating to ownership structure and firm performance. For example, Himmelberg,
Hubbard and Palia (1999) and Kumar (2003) incorporate the squared company size to allow
for the non-linearity in examining the relationship between ownership structure and firm
value or performance.
The detail of the variables used in this study is shown in Table 1 (see Appendices).
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5.

Empirical Results

To examine the determinants of multiple states of financial distress, both the single-risk and
competing-risks model are estimated. This section provides the empirical results obtained
from both the univariate model and the multivariate model. To provide an overall picture
about the characteristics of the data employed in the model, the next section will describe the
empirical results regarding descriptive statistics and the correlation coefficient. Then, the
following sections will discuss the results of the single-risk and competing-risks models.
Descriptive Statistics

Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics (see Appendices). Sample means, medians, standard
deviations, skewness, kurtosis and the number of observations are presented for each
financial distress state.
The Kruskal-Wallis test and its p-value are the result of a non-parametric test showing
the difference between the group means. Variables with a significant difference within the
group means are expected to add information to a regression analysis. The results show that
all variables display a significant difference between the three states of financial distress at
the 5% level except for the variable Age.
It is important to note that before truncation the financial ratios employed have very
large standard deviations. This is due to several outliers which might have influenced the
results. Unlike many previous studies, we use the truncation technique to minimise the effect
of the outliers. All observations with variable values higher than the 99th percentile for each
variable are set to truncate the values. All variable values lower than the 1st percentile of each
variable are then truncated. This is consistent with Shumway (2001). After truncation, the
behaviour of the data (especially the financial ratios) has significantly improved as their
standard deviations are much smaller than before the truncation. However, it is important also
to note that the 99th percentile and the 1st percentile are just arbitrary values 5 . Table 2 reports
these values after truncation.
As shown in Table 2, the means of earnings before taxes (EBT) of all states of the
company are negative, which show the low ability of the company to generate profit. This
shows that the financially distressed companies lost earnings compared to the active
companies. The means of return on equity (ROE) for distressed takeover, merger or
acquisition companies are positive, which implies that these companies have a higher ability
to generate earnings than both active and distressed external administration companies.
Similar results are observed for return on assets (ROA). The mean of ROA is also positive for
distressed takeover, merger or acquisition companies, while it is negative for active and
distressed external administration companies.
For liquidity ratios, the means of financially distressed companies for both current
ratio (CUR) and quick ratio (QUK) are lower than those of the active companies. This shows
that distressed companies have a greater ability to meet their current obligations compared to
the active companies.
It is found that financially distressed companies in all states have a lesser capacity to
pay off their long term liabilities compared to the active companies, which indicates the
means of debt ratio (DET).
For activity ratios, capital turnover (CPT) and total asset turnover (TAT), the mean
values of both ratios show mixed results. For the variable CPT, the mean value for active
companies is higher than for distressed external administration companies but lower than for
5

The values are considered arbitrary here because we do not know exactly what the optimal threshold to be used
is.
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distressed takeover, merger or acquisition companies. However, the means of TAT for
financially distressed companies in all states are higher than the active companies.
The mean value of companies’ SIZE implies that the size of financially distressed
companies in all states is larger than the size of active companies. The Age of distressed
external administration and distressed takeover, merger or acquisition companies is higher
than the size of the active companies.
Finally, the mean of excess returns (EXR) suggests that the past excess returns for
active companies is higher than for the distressed external administration companies but
lower than for the distressed takeover, merger or acquisition companies.
Correlation Coefficients

In order to investigate the relationships between the variables, an examination of the
correlation coefficients across the variables was carried out. The Pearson correlation
coefficients are shown in Table 3 (see Appendices). The results indicate weak relationships
across most of the variables except for current (CUR) and quick (QUK) ratios which are
highly correlated. Since both these two financial ratios measure liquidity, we only use CUR
as the proxy for liquidity ratios in the following regressions. These results suggest that most
of the employed variables in the study provide unique information for the model.
The Model Estimation Results

In order to examine the determinants of multiple states of financial distress, and to compare
pooled data with the competing-risks model, nine financial ratios, a market-based variable
and three company specific variables are analysed into Cox’s model. The variables used are
time-dependent variables covering the period from 1989 to 2005. The estimation results of
the competing-risks model are presented in Table 4 (see Appendices).
In order to highlight the effect of allowing for multiple states of financial distress, the
estimation results are presented from both the single-risk model or pooled model (where all
states of financial distress are pooled together) and the competing-risks model. Panel (A)
contains the results for the single-risk model while Panel (B) contains the competing-risks
model estimation. The coefficients estimation for each panel with the relative p-values for
testing the null hypothesis is shown in the first two columns and the hazard ratio is presented
in the last column.
The hazard ratio is obtained by computing eβ, where β is the coefficient in the
proportional hazards model. A hazard ratio equal to 1 indicates that the variable has no effect
on survival. A hazard ratio greater (less) than 1 indicates a faster (slower) hazard timing.
Single-risk Model Estimation

When we pooled all of the different states of financial distress together, three variables were
found to be highly significant at the 5% level. These variables are TAT, SIZE and SIZE2 with
the coefficients of -0.1825, 1.2398 and -0.0302 respectively. The variables ROA and DET are
also significant at 10% with the estimated coefficients -0.4461 and 0.3275 respectively.
The coefficient of TAT is negative, indicating an increase in the firm’s ability to
utilise assets which can decrease the hazards of becoming financially distressed. The hazard
ratio for TAT is 0.8330. This indicates a unit increase in the total assets turnover ratio, and the
risk of becoming financially distressed decreased by 16.7%. The positive sign of SIZE
indicates that the larger the size of a company the higher the likelihood that it becomes
financially distressed. This is because a large company might have inflexible management
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and have problems monitoring managers and employees; consequently, the company may
have inefficient communication and then face financial difficulties (Rommer 2004).
Considering SIZE2, the result suggests that the effect of company size on financial
distress is the inverted U-shaped or bell-shaped curve. However, this finding is not consistent
with Rommer (2004), who suggests a U-shaped relationship between firm size and the
likelihood of financial distress.
One possible explanation for this is that the sample used is not totally representative
of the population for both publicly listed and non-listed Australian companies. The sample
with a relatively large size might have captured only the effect of size on the likelihood of
financial distress for those companies. In other words, the results might not have captured the
effect of company size on financial distress for non-publicly listed companies which are
relatively small in size.
In addition, the coefficient of ROA is negative, indicating that an increase in a firm’s
ability to generate earnings can decrease the hazard of becoming financially distressed. The
hazard ratio for ROA is 0.6400 which indicates a unit increase in ROA, and the risk of
becoming financially distressed decreases by 36%. This is consistent with the expectation
that companies with a high ability to generate earnings are less likely to face financial
difficulties.
The estimated variable DET is positive, indicating that the company with a low debt
ratio is less likely to become financially distressed. The hazard ratio for DET is 1.3880. That
is, for every unit increase in debt ratio, the risk of becoming financially distressed increases
by 38.8%.
Competing-risks Model Estimation

The empirical results are reported in Table 4 (see Appendices). From the estimation results,
we found that the working capital to total assets ratio (WCA) and EXR are significant factors
in explaining the risk of financial distress through an external administration process but they
do not significantly affect the risk of the takeover, merger or acquisition of a company.
It is also found that WCA significantly affects the risk of filing an external
administration process, but it does not drive the risk of the takeover, merger or acquisition of
a company. The coefficient of WCA is positive, indicating an increase in working capital to
total assets ratio which can enhance the possibility of the hazard facing an external
administration process. The ratio used for measuring the company liquidity, as considered in
Altman (1968a), shows that a firm experiencing consistent operating losses will have
shrinking current assets in relation to total assets. This result contrasts the expected results in
that a company with a high liquidity should have a lower likelihood of facing financial
difficulties.
For EXR, the coefficient is negative, indicating an increase in a company’s past excess
returns which decreases the hazards of becoming financially distressed. The hazard ratio for
EXR is 0.4710 indicating an increase of one unit in a company’s past excess returns which
implies a 52.9% decrease in the risk of financial distress. This indicates the potential of
market data as a good predictor of corporate financial distress. Shumway (2001) and
Partington et al. (2006) also reported similar consistent findings.
The variables DET and SIZE significantly affect the hazard of entering financial
distress both through external administration and through takeover, merger or acquisition.
The variable DET has different signs between the distressed external administration model
and the distressed takeover, merger or acquisition model. In the distressed external
administration model, DET has a positive coefficient, while in the distressed takeover, merger
or acquisition model, DET has a negative coefficient. These results imply that the company

38

Chancharat, Tian, Davy, McCrae and Lodh: Financially Distressed Companies and a Competing-risks Model

with a lower debt to total assets ratio is less likely to file an external administration process
but is more likely to be a candidate for takeover, merger or acquisition. Schary (1991) also
found that debt ratio is negatively related to the probability of a merger. The reasonable
explanation for this result is that companies with lower leverage ratios are likely to be
attractive targets to acquirers who have perhaps taken on debt to enable them to purchase the
company (Dickerson, Gibson & Tsakalotos 1999).
The coefficient sign of SIZE is positive in both models. The positive sign of SIZE
indicates that the larger the size of a company the higher the likelihood of entering into
financial distress; both through the external administration process and through takeover,
merger or acquisition. One reason for this is that a large company might have inflexible
management and thus have problems monitoring managers and employees thus leading to
inefficient communication (Rommer 2004). Perez, Llopis and Llopis (2002) also report
consistent results showing that the risk of acquisition increases with company size and
suggest that large firms tend to be involved in mergers.
The covariant CPT and squared size of the company (SIZE2) are found to
significantly affect the risk of the takeover, merger or acquisition of a company, but this is
not significantly related to the probability of entering an external administration process.
The coefficient sign of CPT is positive, implying an increase in the operating revenue
to operating invested capital, indicating an increased hazard for the takeover, merger or
acquisition of the company. A reasonable explanation for this is that a company which uses
its assets efficiently will increase its income and liquidity position, and therefore it is more
attractive for its takeover, merger or acquisition. Wheelock and Wilson (2000) also found
consistent results in identifying the determinants of bank failure and acquisition. The authors
suggest that inefficient banks, in terms of excessive use or payment for physical plant or
labour, are less likely to be acquired.
The estimated coefficient for SIZE2 of distressed takeover, merger or acquisition is
negative. This suggests that the effect of company size on distressed takeover, merger or
acquisition is the inverted U-shaped or bell-shaped curve. This finding is consistent with
Bhattacharjee et al. (2004), who also found a bell-shaped relationship between firm size and
the likelihood of being acquired. In particular, their findings support medium-sized listed
firms being more likely candidates for acquisition.
In summary, our results suggest that there are differences in the factors determining
which companies enter the different states of financial distress. Specifically, distressed
external administration companies have a higher leverage, lower past excess returns and a
larger size compared to active companies. In comparison, distressed takeover, merger or
acquisition companies have a lower leverage, a higher capital utilisation efficiency and a
larger size compared to active companies.
Comparing the Models

Comparing the estimation results between the single-risk model and the competing-risks
model, we found that DET and SIZE are common significant variables in both the single-risk
model and the competing-risks model.
The coefficient signs of DET in the single-risk and the distressed external
administration in the competing-risks model are both positive, which indicates that the
company with the lower debt-to-total assets ratio is less likely to become financially
distressed. However, the sign of the parameter for DET is negative for a distressed takeover,
merger or acquisition in the competing-risks model. This indicates that the company with the
higher debt has a lower probability of becoming a distressed takeover, merger or acquisition
company.
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The coefficient SIZE is positive in the single-risk model as well as the two
specifications in the competing-risks model. This result implies that company size has the
same effect on the hazard for financial distress in the single-risk model as on the hazard for
filing an external administration process and the hazard for distressed takeover, merger or
acquisition in the competing-risks model. In particular, the results suggest that the larger the
size of the company, the greater the likelihood of becoming financially distressed.
It should be noted that some variables (i.e. ROA and TAT) that affect the hazard of
financial distress in the single-risk model may not significantly affect the hazard of distressed
external administration and distressed takeover, merger or acquisition in the competing-risks
model.
The estimation of the competing-risks model shows that the covariant ROA is
negative, which implies that a company with a high profitability has a decreased likelihood of
facing financial difficulties. It is found that the variable TAT has a negative estimated sign,
which suggests that companies with a higher ability to utilise assets are less likely to fail.
The variable AGE was never found to be significant in explaining financial distress
for all model specifications. This finding is consistent with the results of Shumway (2001).
Considering the three-state financial distress model specifically (comprising active
companies, distressed external administration companies and distressed takeover, merger or
acquisition companies within the framework of a competing-risks model), it is found that
each state of financial distress is caused by different factors. The empirical estimation results
of a single-risk and a competing-risks model are also compared. The results indicate that both
model specifications result in different significant variables for explaining financial distress.
Therefore, we conclude that distinguishing the financial distress states is an important
consideration to develop the model. This finding is consistent with Harhoff, Stahl and
Woywode (1998), Perez, Llopis and Llopis (2002) and Rommer (2004). Harhoff, Stahl and
Woywode (1998) conclude that a separate consideration of the modes of corporate exit is
highly desirable, they reveal that pooling exit types is a major source of misspecification, and
they also show how the econometric results may be misleading if the distinction between exit
modes is not made.
Survival Probability Evaluation for Multiple States of Financial Distress

The survival functions of typically active, distressed external administration and distressed
takeover, merger or acquisition companies are presented in Figure 1 (below). The survival
function defines the probability that a company will survive longer than t time units. The
function starts with 1 at the beginning, and declines as more companies become financially
distressed.
The survival function shown in Figure 1 is produced by averaging the estimated
survival probability of companies by the different states of financial distress (that is, State 0:
active companies; State 1: distressed external administration companies; and State 2:
distressed takeover, merger or acquisition companies).
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Figure 1
Graph of Survival Function and Survival Time by Financial Distress States

According to Figure 1, the survival probability of typical financially distressed
external administration companies is lower than that of typical active companies and
distressed takeover, merger or acquisition companies. The survival probability starts with 1
and slightly declines afterward. The noticeable decrease in corporate survival for distressed
external administration companies occurs after 9 years as more companies become
financially distressed.
The probability of survival beyond 17 years for active and distressed takeover, merger
or acquisition companies is approximately 88.61% and 90.18% respectively; while that for
distressed external administration companies is approximately 76.77%. The survival profile
of active companies and distressed takeover, merger or acquisition companies is very similar.
Additionally, the probability that distressed takeover, merger or acquisition companies will
survive beyond year 12 to year 14, and also year 16 to year 17, is slightly higher than that of
active companies. One possible explanation for these results is that distressed takeover,
merger or acquisition companies have a lower leverage, a higher capital utilisation efficiency
and a larger size compared to active companies. Therefore, these companies have a slightly
higher probability of survival than active companies.
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6.

Conclusion

Companies face a range of financial health states, and may exit the market in several ways
such as through merger, acquisition, voluntary liquidation or bankruptcy, where each form of
exit is likely to be caused by different factors. Models that allow for multiple states of
financial distress provide a wider range of distress scenarios that public companies typically
face in reality. Therefore this study focussed on examining the determinants of multiple states
of financial distress using the competing-risks model and comparing the empirical results to
the pooled model.
To examine the determinants of multiple states of financial distress, this study
provided an unordered three-state financial distress model based on a sample of publicly
listed Australian non-financial companies, which combined traditional financial ratios,
market-based variables and company-specific variables with a survival analysis technique in
the form of the competing-risks Cox proportional hazards model. The three-state financial
distress was defined as: State 0: active companies; State 1: distressed external administration
companies; and State 2: distressed takeover, merger or acquisition companies.
We incorporated 891 active companies, 50 distressed external administration
companies and 140 distressed takeover, merger or acquisition companies over the period
1989 to 2005, by utilising the competing-risks Cox proportional hazards model with the
proposed variables. Four main categories of financial ratios (profitability, liquidity, leverage
and activity) were used as indicators of financial distress. The company’s past excess returns
were additionally used as a proxy for market-based data. The relationships between
company-specific variables (age, size, squared size and corporate endurance) were also
examined.
The results show that differences exist in the factors which determine whether
companies enter different states of financial distress. Specifically, distressed external
administration companies have a higher leverage, lower past excess returns and a larger size
compared to active companies. Meanwhile, distressed takeover, merger or acquisition
companies have a lower leverage, a higher capital utilisation efficiency and a larger size
compared to active companies. The conclusion from comparing the results from the singlerisk model and the competing-risks model is that distinguishing between financial distress
states is important. However, the results do not support the importance of the company age
factor in explaining financial distress.
Further implications of this study relate to future research on potential factors for
predicting corporate failure which need to be considered, such as corporate governance
variables and macroeconomic variables.
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Appendices
Table 1
The Covariates used in the Study
Category

No.

Covariate

Code

Definition

1.

EBIT margin

EBT

EBIT / operating revenue

2.

Return on equity

ROE

NPAT before abnormals / (shareholders equity-outside equity interests)

3.

Return on assets

ROA

Earnings before interest / (total assets-outside equity interests)

4.

Current ratio

CUR

Current assets / current liabilities

5.

Quick ratio

QUK

(Current assets-current inventory) / current liabilities

6.

Working capital/total assets

WCA

Working capital / total assets

Leverage

7.

Debt ratio

DET

Total debts / total assets

Activity

8.

Capital turnover

CPT

Operating revenue / operating-invested capital before goodwill

9.

Total asset turnover

TAT

Operating revenues / total assets

10.

Size of company

SIZE

Natural logarithm of sales

11.

Squared size

SIZE2

The square of natural logarithm of sales

12.

Age of company

AGE

The number of years since registration

13.

Excess returns (year t)

EXR

A company’s stock return in year t-1 minus ASX 200 index return in year t-1

Profitability

Liquidity

Company-Specific

Market Based

Note: All data were obtained from the FinAnalysis Database, Aspect Huntley Company — except for the S&P/ASX 200 monthly index data,
which were obtained from the Dx Database.
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics of the Data

Active (n = 891)
Mean

ROE

ROA

-0.1404

-0.1301

Median
Min

-0.0081

-0.0085

Max

CUR

QUK

WCA

DET

CPT

TAT

7.2254

6.9260

0.0415

0.3942

3.3850

0.7713

1.7600

1.3000

0.0128

0.3433

0.9230

0.4394

0.0500

0.0400

-1.0000

0.0047

0.0002

0.0002

155.0900

155.0900

0.6999

3.5587

82.7817

5.7367

18.6848

18.7216

0.2201
-0.9343

0.4282
3.9324

9.9278

0.9912
2.3255

5.8129

23.7046

6.3372

6.9079

-2.3701

SIZE

SIZE2

AGE

EXR

15.4840

253.6566

19.4838

-0.1211

15.9391

254.0548

14.0000

-0.0805

6.7708
22.5982

45.8436
510.6794

1.0000
90.0000

-2.2731

Std. Dev.
Skewness

-4.2639

Kurtosis

2.5722

0.3884

5.4057

5.3990

0.7526

0.4061

33.4315

33.3725

-2.4059

-3.3643

-0.3126
0.1798

2.0393

13.9761

13.5418

-0.5608

-0.6265

4.1816

1.1784

44.3049

2.0433
3.7188

111.9211

18.4983

0.7280
-0.0737

Distressed External Administration (n = 50)
Mean

-0.1022

-0.1587

5.1382

4.9091

0.0282

0.5859

2.9237

0.8548

15.8297

259.8330

22.0454

-0.2475

Median
Min

0.0025

-0.0062

1.3200
0.0500

1.0400
0.0400

0.0106
-1.0000

0.4556
0.0047

0.8820
0.0004

0.4533
0.0002

16.4390

270.2389

17.0000

-0.2096

155.0900

155.0900

0.6999
0.2756

3.5587
0.7348

51.4800

5.7367
1.1424

7.4396

55.3470

1.0000

-2.2731

21.5449

464.1840

90.0000

Max
Std. Dev.

-4.2639

Skewness

2.5722

Kurtosis

0.7766

-2.3701

0.3884

17.3525

17.3967

-1.4149

2.9279

6.9209

2.6287

7.2412

7.2240

5.0272

8.6108

4.8427

7.9975
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ROE

ROA

-1.5362

0.5007

CUR

QUK

55.7535

55.5423

WCA

DET

CPT

TAT

26.4602

-3.2754

SIZE

SIZE2

3.0109

89.6430

-0.6863

-0.2302

10.7583

-0.3737
10.7957

-0.0097

AGE
16.6491

EXR
0.8061
-0.0785

1.3985
2.6935

1.0194

Distressed Takeover, Merger or Acquisition (n = 140)
Mean

0.0270

0.0124

3.6748

3.2616

0.0827

0.4907

3.7742

1.0201

17.9684

329.6880

22.2363

-0.0691

Median
Min

0.0825
-4.2639

0.0538
-2.3701

1.5000
0.0500

1.0100
0.0400

0.0460
-1.0000

0.4663
0.0047

1.5115
0.0003

0.8167
0.0002

18.1779

330.4352

14.0000

-0.0556

Max
Std. Dev.

155.0900

155.0900

0.3884

0.6999
0.1951

3.5587
0.4269

82.7817

2.5722

5.7367
0.9212

6.9078

47.7171

1.0000

-2.2731

Skewness

0.5037

0.2137

11.7242

11.7859

-0.3701

4.9554

9.1551

2.1054

22.4284

503.0313

90.0000

Kurtosis

-3.8848

-6.4543

8.5974

8.5643

4.7533

32.1249

5.8140

6.7491

87.2817

86.6035

38.0125

39.5832

57.7766

2.0433
2.6052

86.8882

-1.0868

-0.5215
0.2680

1.7751

20.6510
0.5769
1.4579
1.4020

0.1276
2.9682

Kruskal-Wallis Test
p-value

43.4135
<.0001

64.7073
<.0001

33.3688
<.0001

37.5854
<.0001

9.3162
0.0095

22.3618
<.0001

7.2498
0.0267

21.2755
<.0001

70.2482
<.0001

70.6205
<.0001

2.6275
0.2688

9.9025
0.0071

Note: Descriptive statistics are grouped by company status. Kruskal-Wallis test from a non-parametric test of equality of group means.
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Table 3
Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Covariate

EBT

EBT

1.0000*

ROE
ROA
CUR
QUK
WCA

ROE
0.1027
<.0001
1.0000

ROA
0.1692
<.0001
0.4624
<.0001
1.0000

CUR
-0.0919
<.0001
-0.0176
0.0572
-0.0262
0.0047
1.0000

QUK
-0.0948
<.0001
-0.0200
0.0306
-0.0307
0.0009
0.9995
<.0001
1.0000

WCA

DET

0.0763
<.0001
0.0467
<.0001
0.3627
<.0001
0.0885
<.0001
0.0773
<.0001
1.0000

0.0931
<.0001
0.1441
<.0001
-0.2213
<.0001
-0.2531
<.0001
-0.2525
<.0001
-0.3456
<.0001
1.0000

DET

CPT
0.0638
<.0001
0.0008
0.9295
-0.0370
<.0001
-0.0513
<.0001
-0.0496
<.0001
-0.1213
<.0001
0.1252
<.0001
1.0000

CPT

TAT
0.1756
<.0001
0.1562
<.0001
0.1096
<.0001
-0.1821
<.0001
-0.1864
<.0001
0.0665
<.0001
0.3926
<.0001
0.3770
<.0001
1.0000

TAT

SIZE
0.4567
<.0001
0.2395
<.0001
0.3738
<.0001
-0.3051
<.0001
-0.3125
<.0001
0.1979
<.0001
0.2719
<.0001
0.1291
<.0001
0.5000
<.0001
1.0000

SIZE

SIZE2
0.3843
<.0001
0.2454
<.0001
0.3773
<.0001
-0.2966
<.0001
-0.3038
<.0001
0.1973
<.0001
0.2683
<.0001
0.1190
<.0001
0.4940
<.0001
0.9900
<.0001
1.0000

SIZE2

AGE
0.0686
<.0001
0.0740
<.0001
0.1085
<.0001
-0.0951
<.0001
-0.1000
<.0001
0.1327
<.0001
0.0696
<.0001
-0.0250
0.0069
0.1346
<.0001
0.2905
<.0001
0.3130
<.0001
1.0000

AGE

EXR
-0.0017
0.8579
0.0817
<.0001
0.1242
<.0001
-0.0172
0.0640
-0.0181
0.0503
0.0624
<.0001
-0.0372
<.0001
-0.0461
<.0001
0.0109
0.2408
0.0639
<.0001
0.0728
<.0001
0.0644
<.0001
1.0000

EXR

Note: * Pearson correlation coefficients. The p-value is under the null hypothesis of zero correlation.
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Table 4
Single-risk and Competing-risks Cox Proportional Hazards Model Estimation
(A) Single-Risk Model

Covariate

(B) Competing-Risks Model
Distressed External Administration Companies Distressed Takeover, Merger or Acquisition Companies

Coefficient

p-Value

Hazard Ratio

Coefficient

p-Value

Hazard Ratio

Coefficient

p-Value

Hazard Ratio

EBT

-0.0018

0.1790

0.9980

-0.0006

0.7029

0.9990

-0.0019

0.5152

0.9980

ROE

-0.0254

0.7962

0.9750

-0.0805

0.5584

0.9230

0.0195

0.9083

1.0200

ROA

-0.4461*

0.0584

0.6400

-0.4143

0.1766

0.6610

-0.3871

0.3597

0.6790

CUR

-0.2703

0.1742

0.7667

-0.6156

0.1789

0.5435

-0.1787

0.4446

0.8359

WCA

0.2065

0.6242

1.2290

0.9740*

0.0738

2.6490

-0.3987

0.5314

0.6710

DET

0.3275*

0.0968

1.3880

0.9205**

<.0001

2.5100

-0.7975*

0.0596

0.4500

CPT

0.0086

0.2060

1.0090

-0.0053

0.7541

0.9950

0.0131*

0.0915

1.0130

TAT

-0.1825**

0.0497

0.8330

-0.1919

0.2401

0.8250

-0.1554

0.1809

0.8560

SIZE

1.2398**

0.0001

3.4550

0.8393*

0.0753

2.3150

1.6956**

0.0003

5.4500

SIZE2

-0.0302**

0.0008

0.9700

-0.0223

0.1161

0.9780

-0.0412**

0.0014

0.9600

AGE

-0.0031

0.4312

0.9970

-0.0014

0.8751

0.9990

-0.0028

0.5224

0.9970

EXR

-0.1375

0.2219

0.8720

-0.7538**

0.0002

0.4710

0.1167

0.3925

1.1240

Number of events

190

50

140

Note: * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level.
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